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Tax Treaties and Enterprise Outcomes: Evidence Across Developing 
African Countries 
 




Studies have noted the possibility of tax treaties constraining the tax policy autonomy of 
developing countries, while their impact on enterprise development within host economies 
remains an empirical issue. This study examines the effects and heterogeneous differences 
in estimated effects of tax treaties on small businesses in developing countries that agree to  
these agreements. The study uses the ICTD tax treaties dataset and the World Bank 
Enterprise Survey data to set up a quasi-experiment framework for selected African 
Countries. The framework compares countries’ outcomes for small businesses that ratify and 
enforce a tax treaty and those without a ratified tax treaty for the years pre-2005–2010 and 
post-2011–2019). We find that tax treaties signed and enforced by developing countries in 
Africa have a consistent, negative relationship with small business outcomes. These results 
are driven by the enterprise’s size and internationalisation status but not by the subsidiary 
status of the sampled small businesses. The findings have implications for policy targeted 
towards industrial development alongside tax treaty negotiations. 
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Spill-over effects on enterprise development in host countries from foreign 
investments (i.e. foreign direct investment [FDI]) can be positive or negative. On the one 
hand, some studies argue that FDI presence could increase competition in the local input 
and output market (Agbloyor, Abor, Adjasi and Yawson 2014) and crowd-out local 
enterprises that cannot compete with foreign firms. On the other hand, Reyes (2018) 
highlights that FDI could positively impact local enterprises through two main channels: the 
first is the contractual link through the demand for input from local suppliers, which results in 
the growth of indigenous businesses. The second is through improving the stock of human 
capital by hiring and training the indigenous workforce that later transmits such skills to local 
enterprises. 
 
Despite the controversies over the impact of FDI on enterprise development in host 
countries, policymakers in developing countries are receptive to strategies that attract and 
support FDI for broad economic and industrial development1. Such strategies include signing 
tax treaties aimed at restricting if, how and how much multinationals are taxed to eliminate 
barriers to the inflow of foreign capital to host countries (see Hearson 2016). However, there 
are arguments showing that tax treaties constrain the tax policy autonomy of developing 
countries and, most important to this study, how they impact enterprise development, which 
still remains an empirical question.  
 
This research sets out to answer three main research questions: (a) what is the effect 
of ratified tax treaties on small business outcomes? (b) what is the correlation between 
selected components of tax treaties and small business outcomes?, and (c) are there 
heterogeneous differences in the estimated effects by the size, the internationalisation status 
and the subsidiary status of small businesses in the host countries? We rely on the updated 
ICTD dataset on tax treaties and the World Bank Enterprise Survey data to set up a quasi-
experiment framework. The framework compares the outcomes of small businesses in 
African countries that ratify and enforce a tax treaty and those in countries without a ratified 
tax treaty and for the years pre-2005–2010 and post-2011–2019 of such ratification. We 
control for the year, and industry fixed effect to adjust for unobservable differences at the 
time and industry levels. We cluster standard errors at the country level to improve our 
identification. 
 
We find the following from our analysis: firstly, we show that the overall ratification of 
the tax treaty adversely affects small business outcomes. Specifically, small businesses in 
treaty countries record a significant decline of around 68 per cent in total revenues, a 
significant decline of 14.6 per cent in the likelihood of introducing a new product and a 
significant decline of 48 per cent in the size of employees. The estimates for total revenues 
and the number of employees are the magnitudes of decline from the mean of the 
enterprises in countries without tax treaty enforcement. These results are not sensitive to the 
inclusion (or otherwise) of control variables, and the results are robust to the clustering of 
standard errors at the industry-country level and the use of a matched sample for the 
difference-in-difference analysis.  
 
Secondly, there is a 29 per cent significant correlational decline in staff size resulting 
from tax treaty components that align with the OECD model in delivering exceptions to 
permanent establishments. Furthermore, we find a 15 per cent decline in innovation from the 
inclusion of the provision for source capital gains on ‘land rich’ companies according to the 
 
1  For instance, there is consensus that FDI inflow is positively related to increasing technology and knowledge transfer, 
economic diversification and value addition, capital inflow, job creation and an increase in the productivity of domestic 
enterprises (Gui-Diby and Renard 2015; Thompson and Zang 2018). 
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OECD and UN model. Regarding the provisions for withholding tax rate on interest and 
royalties, we find that a 1 per cent increase in the withholding tax rate respectively results in 
a 12.9 per cent increase in revenues and a 4 per cent increase in innovation. We interpret 
these results as the correlational effect of the different provisions of tax treaties on small 
business outcomes in developing countries.  
 
Thirdly, we record some evidence of heterogeneity by the size of the enterprise, 
internationalisation exposure and not by the subsidiary status of the sampled firms, 
highlighting that small enterprises are worse off with tax treaties. In other words, the negative 
effect of tax treaties on the total revenue and employee size of the enterprise that we earlier 
recorded is mostly seen in small enterprises (i.e. those with more than ten and less than 50 
workers). Furthermore, regarding the extent of innovation, we find that tax treaties 
significantly and negatively affect medium-sized enterprises. In addition, we see a significant 
negative effect of tax treaties on the total revenue and innovation for firms with no 
internationalisation exposure, unlike firms with some level of internationalisation.  
 
Our findings contribute to the broad literature on tax treaty negotiations and their 
impact in developing countries. Hearson (2018) notes that factors that influence the 
likelihood of tax treaty negotiations and agreement in developing countries is informed by the 
size of the government’s revenue base and the countries’ reliance on corporate tax. 
Likewise, other studies examining tax treaty impacts have considered changes in foreign 
investment, such as Beer and Loeprick (2021), showing from a sample of 41 African 
economies from 1985–2015 that tax treaties do not increase foreign investment inflow. 
Similar findings were recorded in Egger, Larch, Pfaffermayr and Winner (2006), who link tax 
treaties to negative outward FDI stocks. On the other hand, Castillo-Murciego and Lopez-
Laborda (2019) find a positive FDI effect from agreed rules in the Double Taxation Treaties 
by Spain and investors’ residence country. Yet, other studies have considered the 
government revenue effect from tax treaties, including Beer and Loeprick (2021), who find an 
adverse effect on government revenues of SSA countries from bilateral tax treaties. Similarly, 
Janský and Šedivý (2019) also find revenue losses from tax treaties in developing countries. 
However, it is not clear from these studies how bilateral tax treaties signed by African 
countries affect domestic enterprises.  
 
The heterogeneous effects explored in this study have important policy implications 
for advocacy intended to measure the effectiveness of tax treaties on specific and different 
small businesses in developing African countries. As we have shown, these effects vary by 
the size of the business and their level of international exposure. Finally, the findings of this 
study also have a practical application by highlighting that multinational companies attracted 
to developing countries from tax treaty agreements could have important implications for 
domestic enterprise development in the treaty-partner African country. Therefore, our 
findings present important perspectives regarding the small business implication from 
bilateral fiscal agreements by African countries, which may be relevant information for 
consideration in future tax treaty negotiations by country in this region.  
 
1 Literature review and analytical framework 
 
1.1 Literature review 
 
An important element in tax treaty negotiations is the mitigation of double taxation, 
especially as it applies to multinational enterprises with operations in multiple countries 
(Neumayer 2007). Blonigen, Oldenski and Sly (2014) note that the intention of bilateral tax 
treaties (BTTs) is to advance foreign direct investment through double-taxation relief. In 
10 
 
addition to tax relief, Egger and Merlo (2011) added that treaties specify tax parameters that 
may be of interest between two countries (such as withholding tax, capital gains tax) and 
establish an agreement about information exchange to reduce tax avoidance. The view that 
tax treaties benefit developing countries by stimulating investment inflow is pervasive 
(Hearson 2018), but with varying conclusions. For example, Beer and Loeprick (2021) note 
that tax treaties (with investment hubs) are not associated with additional investment flow, 
which is similar to the conclusions in Egger et al. (2006). The authors find a negative 
relationship between treaties and the stock of outward FDI flows based on OECD data 
between 1985 and 2000. In essence, despite treaties being beneficial theoretically, their 
benefits (especially relating to stimulating investment) may be minimal (Davies 2004). On the 
other hand, Egger and Merlo (2011) find that a double taxation treaty induces a positive 
effect on multinational firm activities, relying on a two-part quasi maximum-likelihood model 
and panel data on the foreign businesses of German multinational enterprises (MNEs) 
between 1996-2005. Likewise, Barthel, Busse, Krever and Neumayer (2010), using an 
unpublished data set, find that double-taxation treaties (DTTs) cause a higher significant 
inflow of FDI stocks while acknowledging that a wide range of potential endogenous factors 
(including macro-political and economic changes, and change in economic policies) may 
explain both the rise in the number of treaties and the volume of FDI. Petkova, Stasio and 
Zagler (2020) further find that ‘relevant’ double tax treaties will increase FDI by about 18 per 
cent. A similar result is seen by Bloningen et al. (2014) and Castillo-Murciego and López-
Laborda (2019) studies with the conclusion of a positive effect of BTTs on FDI flow.  
 
Yet, other studies have probed the efficacy of bilateral tax treaties on domestic 
revenue generation. Beer and Loeprick (2021) highlight that, by restricting taxing rights and 
through the abuse of treaty networks using shell companies, tax treaties can contribute to the 
loss of a country’s tax base and facilitate tax avoidance. Similarly, Janský and Šedivý (2019) 
also find revenue losses from tax treaties in developing countries. Hence, as relevant and 
laudable as tax treaties may seem, there may be attendant costs on government revenues 
and investments, which can translate to adverse outcomes for domestic enterprises. 
 
In realising the benefits from tax treaties, Quak and Timmis (2018) argue that there is 
a significant asymmetry in tax negotiations between high-income and low-income countries. 
Hearson (2018) highlights this issue, noting that the presence of power asymmetries 
between tax treaty signatories could shift taxing rights away from developing countries, which 
could adversely affect domestic revenue. Noting the non-asymmetrical nature of some tax 
treaties, some African countries such as South Africa, Zambia, and Rwanda are beginning to 
reconsider or revise (as in the case of Uganda) their agreements. Moreover, some 
developed economies, such as the Netherlands and Ireland, offered to renegotiate the 
conditions of their treaties (Hearson 2015). Our study extends this broad debate on tax treaty 
agreements and their impacts by focusing on domestic enterprises’ effects in developing 
African countries. 
 
1.2 Analytical Framework 
 
We conceptualise the link between tax treaties and small business outcomes as 
arising in two stages. In the first stage, tax treaties imply a set of agreements between 
countries that specify tax parameters of interest at the bilateral level (such as withholding tax, 
capital gains tax) and establish an agreement about information exchange to reduce tax 
avoidance (Egger and Merlo 2011), which matters for: (a) domestic revenue generation; and 
(b) investment inflow. In the next stage, each of these outcomes from the tax treaties has 
implications for the primitives in a model of industrial development policies, namely (among 
others) the physical infrastructural conditions and spill-overs or other linkages that emanate 
from changes in domestic revenue and foreign investment flow (see Newman, Page, Rand, 
Shimeles, Soderbom and Tarp 2016). For instance, assuming tax treaties improve foreign 
investment inflow, some authors note a positive effect on industrial development (the value-
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added market outcome and employment growth) through: (a) competition and linkage effects 
(Gui-Diby and Renard 2015); (b) contractual linkage and improved stock of human capital - 
by hiring and training the indigenous workforce that later transmits such skills to local 
enterprises (Reyes 2018); and (c) technology diffusions, innovation, technology transfer, and 
other joint venture agreements (Gorg and Strobl 2005; Falk 2015), among others. On the 
other hand, it is also possible that there are adverse small business outcomes from 
increasing foreign investment inflow as a result of tax treaties. These include that through 
competition, foreign investments could hurt small businesses (Nam and Young 2004). 
Furthermore, inefficiencies in small-business level of production from losses in market share 
and spreading fixed costs over smaller output as a result of rising competition could be an 
adverse outcome from rising foreign investment flow due to tax treaties (Lipsey 2004). 
Moreover, there could be a reduction in research and development (R&D) efforts due to 
shrinking profit from aggressive competition from foreign investors.  
 
Although there is no overwhelming evidence, some other authors find no significant 
impact of foreign investment on small business growth. For instance, Kaya (2010) finds no 
significant impact of FDI inflows on industrialisation for developing countries. Elu and Price 
(2010) observe no significant impact on total factor productivity for Chinese FDI in five Sub-
Saharan African countries from 1992 to 2004.  
 
In summary, tax treaties may lead to an exogenous shock (probably positive, but 
some studies find negative) on the flow of foreign capital. Any such shock would be expected 
to have an impact on small, domestically-owned businesses. It is this indirect impact of tax 
treaties that we seek to study. 
 




This study relies on the World Bank’s Enterprise Survey and the ICTD data on tax 
treaties worldwide to analyse the link between tax treaties and high-growth outcomes of 
firms. The Enterprise Survey (ES) is comprehensive and uses a standard questionnaire and 
uniform sampling method to produce cross-country comparable data on manufacturing and 
service firms. The survey generation strategy includes stratified samples on the sector, firm 
size (in terms of employees) and geographical location. The ES sample does not include 
firms with 100 per cent state ownership, and the example generated for each country is 
representative of the non-agricultural formal private economy. The ES data provides general 
information about the firm, sales and export, capacity utilisation, infrastructural service in the 
firm’s community, employment level and growth rate, innovation, and other firm 
characteristics. The firm-level information offered in the ES will enable the inclusion of more 
control variables in our regression analysis. 
 
To correctly set up the identification strategy, we have restricted our sample to only 
African countries with two or more data periods for the years 2005–2019. The ES allows for 
such a setup considering it includes a sufficient longitudinal component to achieve this 
study’s objective. Following the approach of Ayyagari, Juarros, Peria and Singh (2016), we 
further excluded those firms with fewer than five permanent employees. In essence, the 
sampling for this study focuses on firms with more than ten and less than 250 employees. 
The final dataset is a repeated cross-section that includes information about these small 




The ICTD data, on the other hand, offer a rich set of information about tax treaties 
across countries, including over 23000 bilateral and multilateral agreements and amending 
instruments since 1970 by low and lower-middle-income countries in the sub-Sahara African 
and Asian region. We rely on the ratification date (i.e. when the treaty became in force or 
actual ratification), for which the ICTD dataset draws on the International Bureau on Fiscal 
Documentation, to identify countries in the treatment group2. This data is the only source for 
comprehensive information about global tax treaties (including the treaty’s ratification date), 
in general, and those about African countries, specifically. The ICTD datasets were matched 
with the World Bank’s Enterprise Survey to aid the data analysis of this study. 
 
2.1.2 Measuring Enterprise Outcomes 
 
The features of a high growth enterprise include outcomes such as sales and 
revenue growth, innovation, and job creation (Hsieh and Klenow 2014; Haltiwanger, Jarmin 
and Miranda 2016). Some studies argue that identifying high growth outcomes should 
entirely focus on specific firms’ job creation potential since the concept implies that the firm 
plays a disproportionately large role in creating jobs (Haltiwanger et al. 2016; Hsieh and 
Klenow 2014). This study aligns with the conceptualisation of high-growth entrepreneurship 
measures by McKenzie (2017). We define this concept in this study to include total revenue, 
innovation and employment outcomes to capture the realities facing the industrial ecosystem 
in the African region, which could impact overall industrial development, economic growth 
and inclusiveness (Reyes 2017). For instance, survey data indicate that about 99.6 per cent 
of firms have fewer than ten workers, compared to the United States, where comparable 
manufacturing firms have 45 workers (Hsieh and Klenow 2014; McKenzie 2017). Likewise, 
innovation and research and development spending within the region are still incredibly low, 
accounting for about 1.1 per cent of global investments in R&D in 2016. Therefore, 
measuring high growth entrepreneurship based on these three dimensions is relevant to our 
understanding of how tax treaties could matter in improving firm outcomes. 
 
We measure the enterprise’s total revenue from the response to the current sales as 
in the survey year, which we convert to the prevailing US$ rate as in the survey year. This is 
the first outcome variable for this study. The second outcome variable – innovation – is 
measured at the firm level by relying on the answers to the survey question: during the last 
three years, did your establishment introduce any new or significantly improved products 
(goods or services)? If the response to this question is affirmative, we code it as ‘1’ and 
otherwise, ‘0’. This question about innovation is consistent across years and countries in the 
ES. The third outcome variable is the total employment of the enterprise, measured by 
relying on the responses to the Enterprise Survey question regarding the total full-time 
permanent workforce in their establishment.  
 
2.1.3 Tax treaty agreement 
 
The agreement facilitating capital flow – that is, tax treaties – is identified across 
sample African countries by relying on the ICTD dataset. We determine from this dataset the 
African countries and the year in which the treaty was ratified, as well as whether the tax 
treaty is with a top FDI flow country of origin, which is confirmed by the UNCTAD Statistics 
and other public databases. That is, a country is considered a top FDI flow country of origin if 
it is listed among the top ten FDI origin of the sampled African countries in the period of 
signing the treaty.  
 
 
2 Although the recent version of this data (which was not available at the time of this research) contains the exact date when the 
treaty became in force. We do not expect a significant deviation in our result when considering the exact date of the treaty 
becoming in force. 
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 In the Enterprise Survey sample, we identify four countries (Kenya, Lesotho, Malawi 
and Mali) that have a survey both before and after the tax treaty was ratified, dubbed the 
‘treatment group.’ We identify additional five countries (Mauritania, Namibia, Sierra Leone, 
Swaziland and Uganda) that had no new treaties with a top ten FDI origin country coming 
into force during the sample period. We consider samples from these five countries as those 
in the ‘comparison’. It is important at this point to note a specific limitation with our 
identification, which is that, due to data limitations, we are not able to have a comparison 
group that does not have any form of treaties prior to this study’s sample period. 
 
Tax treaty agreement is a dummy variable that takes the value 1 for countries after 
the year the tax treaty was ratified with a top capital and investment flowing country of origin. 
In the years before the ratification of the tax treaties in the countries in the treatment group 
and the comparison group of countries with no tax treaties and implementation in the 
sampled period, we coded the dummy variable as 0. We identified the treatment group as 
such with a treaty with high investment flowing countries and those with a significant 
investment or capital stock in the sample countries. We identified treaty partner countries 
from the ICTD dataset and cross-reference them with the information on investment flow 
from the UNCTAD Statistics (and other public databases) to determine if the treaty is with a 
top ten investment flowing country of origin. For example, the main investor in Kenya and 
Lesotho with a tax treaty in force during the sample period is South Africa, while Mali was 
included in this group considering its increased economic collaboration with Morocco (The 
Economist 2014). Although Norway is not a top FDI investment flow to Malawi, it has 
committed significant investment in three priority sectors, including clean energy, financial 
institutions, and food and agribusiness, since 2017 (see Royal Norwegian Embassy 2019). In 
the robustness check, we examine whether the inclusion of samples from Mali and Malawi 
has an effect on the main results (see the section on robustness check). 
 
The main variable of interest is the interaction of the binary variable that identifies the 
treatment sample with the binary indicator for the post- treaty ratification years. The tax treaty 
ratifications that we consider for this study are those that occurred in the period 2011–2014, 
which we classified as the tax ratification period. Therefore, we consider a pre-ratification 
period as the years 2005–2010 and the post-ratification period as the survey years during 
and after the ratification period (2011–2019), as we only consider data from the period 2005–
2019 (see Table A1.1 for the distribution of survey data across countries). 
 
2.2 Identification strategy and assumption 
 
This study relies on a difference-in-difference setup to achieve its objective. It relies 
on the ratification of tax treaties between the sampled countries and the top investment and 
capital flow country of origin. This action acts as an exogenous shock to the supply of capital 
and investment to African countries. Building on the inconclusive literature on the relationship 
between tax treaties and foreign investment flow (Davies 2004; Egger et al. 2006; Barthel et 
al. 2010; Egger and Merlo 2011; Bloningen et al. 2014; Castillo-Murciego and López-Laborda 
2019; Petkova et al. 2020), we begin by testing this relationship to identify if a tax treaty 
exerts a positive shock on foreign investment flow. The correlational evidence in Table A1.33 
shows an improvement in FDI flow after tax treaty ratification. 
 
 Building on this evidence, we estimate the following model, where the outcomes of 
firm ‘i’ in country ‘j’ in sector/industry ‘k’ at time ‘t’ is a variant of the following: 
 
3 Table A1.3 presents correlational evidence of the association between the variable of interest (Post × Treaty) and the 
indicators of foreign capital flow – including, the ratio of foreign investment to GDP, log of the stock of portfolio investment and 
the ratio of the stock of foreign investment to gross fixed capital formation. The parsimonious regression includes a country and 
year fixed effects, and controls for the indicators of economic growth (the logarithm value of gross domestic product per capita), 




𝐻𝑖𝑔ℎ 𝑔𝑟𝑜𝑤𝑡ℎ𝑖,𝑗,𝑘,𝑡 = 𝜎𝑃𝑜𝑠𝑡𝑡 +  𝛼𝑃𝑜𝑠𝑡 × 𝑇𝑟𝑒𝑎𝑡𝑦𝑗,𝑡 + 𝛽𝑋𝑖,𝑗,𝑘,𝑡 + 𝛾𝑍𝑗,𝑘,𝑡 + 𝜀𝑖,𝑗,𝑘,𝑡 
  
Where ℎ𝑖𝑔ℎ 𝑔𝑟𝑜𝑤𝑡ℎ connotes the indicators of small business outcomes, while Post 
is a dummy 1 for the period after the ratification of the tax treaty agreement, mostly survey 
years from 2011 onward. The primary variable of interest is the interaction between the post-
treaty dummy and the dummy if the country has a tax treaty. X is a matrix of firm-level 
characteristics as presented in Table A1.2, while Z is a matrix of country-level variables that 
can affect small business growth, such as inflation and GDP growth. The usual error term is 
denoted as 𝜀𝑖,𝑗,𝑘,𝑡. We control for the year- and industry-fixed effects and cluster the standard 
errors at the country level in the estimations.  
 
The difference-in-difference (DD) estimation is used to estimate the effect of the tax 
treaty by comparing the changes in small business outcomes over time between a population 
of small businesses in countries that have ratified a treaty and a population of small 
businesses in countries that do not have or have not ratified such treaty. Our identification is 
closer to Ayyagari et al. (2016). The authors consider the employment growth of firms in 
countries that introduce credit bureau relative to firms in countries that do not enter such a 
reform. As it is in the authors’ study, we also use a (fiscal) reform that is identifiable and 
comparable across the selected African countries. Therefore, the primary variable of interest 
Post × Treaty denotes the interaction of dummy for enterprises in the group of countries that 
entered into a tax treaty and ratified it with a dummy that identifies the years after the reform. 
Thus, this framework compares outcomes of enterprises in countries with a tax treaty that is 
ratified and countries without such tax treaties, and periods pre- and post-treaty ratification. 
Therefore, we are better able to examine the effect on high growth outcomes of enterprises 
by considering a countrywide shock to the supply of foreign capital. The tax treaty variable is 
lagged in the equation to allow the realisation of the effect over time. 
 
This study’s approach takes advantage of cross-country variation in tax treaty 
agreement and ratification by countries due to some proponent countries having such status 
while others do not have it. As a result, the difference-in-difference framework is in play while 
controlling for the fixed effects (to adjust some unobserved variations by the industry of the 
enterprise) and year fixed effects that adjust for macro variations across periods. Finally, we 
include the following firm-level characteristics: A dummy ‘1’ if the firm engages in formal 
training of employees. The legal status of the firm – a binary indicator if the enterprise is a 
sole proprietor or a limited liability company; ownership status - if the firm has zero per cent 
ownership by the government; a binary indicator if the owner of the firm or top manager is a 
woman; the number of years of experience of the top manager in the current industry; and 
age of the enterprise – number of years firm has been in operation since its registration. 
Other indicators include a binary indicator if the registration status of the firm is formal, and if 
the enterprise engage in export. Technology utilisation of the firm is a binary indicator if the 
enterprise has a website.  
 
We also include other variables reflecting the enterprise’ external environment (if the 
firm faces any obstacle in accessing credit, business registration, or corruption), access to a 
line of credit (if the firm has any access to credit), access to overdraft (if the firm has any 
access to an overdraft), and asset valuation (‘log’ value of total land and machinery owned 
by the firm in US$). Finally, the country-level control variables in the analysis are the per 
capita GDP and inflation rate. Standard errors are clustered at the country level throughout. 
We subsequently discuss other additional robustness checks. 
 
Our identification relies on the assumption that, in the absence of the tax treaty 
agreement, the difference between the outcomes of enterprises in the non-tax treaty and tax 
treaty countries is equal to zero or constant over time. To test this assumption, we use the 
enterprise survey to analyse the difference in the outcome variables in years leading up to 
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the tax treaty agreement periods. Figure 2.1 reports the results of this difference test. 
Overall, there is no indication of a significant difference in the outcome variables. The 
enterprises are similar during the pre-tax treaty period, except only a marginal difference in 
the extent of innovation for enterprises in the two groups of countries.  
 
It is important to acknowledge upfront that the tax treaties may be endogenous with 
respect to the foreign capital stock. However, this is not a significant threat to our 
identification since the timing or the extent of the treaty agreement is independent of the 
actions of small businesses. 
 
Figure 1.2.1 Average outcome variables of enterprises by country group 
 
 
3 Analysis and results 
 
3.1 Tax treaties in Africa 
 
This section presents a graphical context of tax treaties in Africa. Figure 3.1 presents 
the sum of treaties still in force, those terminated, abandoned, those not in effect and those 
ratified as described in the ICTD data. From the figure, the agreement signed in 1947 
between Sierra Leone, Ghana, and the United Kingdom was the earliest. The Ghana treaty is 
still in force. The other tax treaty in 1949, although terminated, was between Lesotho and the 
United Kingdom. The period 1950–1960 records increased treaty arrangements, with most 
being with other European countries such as Germany, Sweden, Norway and the United 
Kingdom. There are treaty agreements in this period between African countries, such as 
Sierra Leone and South Africa, South Africa and Tanzania, South Africa and Uganda, South 
Africa and Zambia, among others. All the tax treaties agreed in this period - apart from Sierra 
Leone and South Africa, South Africa and Zambia, and Malawi and the United Kingdom - 
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There were about 25 tax treaties between 1961–1970 and an increase in the number 
of those still in force (see Figure 3.1). Only 12 such agreements have been terminated, 
including those between Comoros Island and France, Egypt and Sudan, Malawi and the 
Netherlands, Liberia and Sweden, and South Africa and the United Kingdom. In 1971–1980, 
there were 29 tax treaties agreed upon, and 79 per cent of those treaties are still in force 
(see Figure 3.1). Only five of the 29 agreements are between two African countries: the rest 
of the tax treaties are between African countries and European countries like France, 
Romania, the United Kingdom, Norway, Italy, Spain, Netherlands, Sweden and Malta.  
 
As seen from Figure 3.1, twenty-seven tax treaties were signed in the period 1981–
1990. Three terminated, two are not in force, while the remaining 22 are still in effect. A 
significant increase was seen in the number of treaties in force for the period 1991–2000: 
110 were signed, and 26 were either not in effect, terminated, or abandoned. The remaining 
84 tax treaties are still in force, yet an increase in the number of tax treaties signed in 2001–
2010 is seen, from 110 in the previous period to 122. Out of these tax treaties, only 28 
treaties were either not in force, terminated or ratified. The number of tax treaties in the 
2011–2019 period increased to 135, but most tax treaties in this period (85 of them) are 
either ratified, not in force or abandoned. 
 
The components of these treaties are in the ICTD dataset. Most of the agreements by 
African countries with length in months of construction of permanent establishment (PE) 
(UN= 6 months; OECD=12 months) consider either the UN or OECD model. Very few 
treaties are focused on other lengths, including Rwanda and Turkey in 2018 (not in force), 
Cameroon and UAE in 2017 (ratified), Ethiopia and Poland in 2015 (in force), Ethiopia and 
UAE in 2015, Kenya and Kuwait in 2013, Egypt and Ethiopia in 2011 (in force), Mauritius and 
Zambia in 2011 (in force), among others. These treaties have the length of time for taxing 
construction of PE at nine months. Some other tax treaties, such as Libya and UAE ratified in 
2013 and Algeria and Mauritania in force in 2011, consider three months for this provision. 
Figure 3.2 also displays other issues featured in the tax treaties by African countries in the 








Treaty in force Terminated Abandoned Not in force Ratified
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3.2 Tax treaties and small business outcomes 
 
3.2.1 The effect of tax treaties on small business outcomes 
 
This section explores the relationship between tax treaty ramifications and small 
business outcomes by applying the difference-in-difference estimation. The regression 
results in Table 3.2.1.1 considers the following dependent variables - the log value of total 
revenue (Panel A), a dummy for innovation (Panel B) and the log value of total employment 
(Panel C). Columns (1), (3) and (5) do not include the covariates, while columns (2), (4) and 
(6) adjust for the covariates. We will, therefore, focus the discussion on the most extensive 
model that adjusts for the covariates. The last row in Table 3.2.1.1 includes the mean 
outcome variables of small businesses in countries without the tax treaty’s ratification. 
 
The estimated association on the total revenue of the sampled firms in the Panel A 
column (2) indicates a negative association, which amounts to a 68 per cent significant 
decline from the mean for countries without the tax treaty enforcement. The coefficients are 
not sensitive to the inclusion of the control variables. In the model that considers innovation 
output in Panel B column (2), we also find an about 14.6 per cent significant reduction in the 
likelihood of introducing a new product for firms as a result of tax treaty ratification. The 
coefficients are also not sensitive to the inclusion of the control variables as we find a similar 
sign, magnitude and significant values for columns (3) and (4) of Panel B. Panel C column 
(6) report the effect of a tax treaty on the size of employees of the sampled enterprises. The 
result shows a significant negative association, which is equivalent to an about 48 per cent 
reduction from the mean of enterprises in the comparison group. Likewise, the coefficients 
are not sensitive to the inclusion of the control variables and the results in columns (5) and 
(6) are economically and statistically similar.  
 
The estimated results are consistent with studies that have focused on the effect of a 
tax treaty on developing countries. For example, Beer and Loeprick (2021) estimate a 
sizeable 22 per cent reduction in government revenues of sampled sub-Saharan Africa 
(SSA) countries from a specific tax treaty agreement (i.e. investment hub treaties). Other 
studies raise concern regarding the negative consequences of tax treaties on SSA countries 
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Revenue  Innovation (1 if firm introduced new 
product) 
 
Size of employees 
  [1] [2]  [3] [4]  [5] [6] 
















Control variables  
No Yes  No Yes  
No Yes 
Country observation  
9 9  9 9  
9 9 
Firm observation  
5,328 3,159  5,000 3,200  
6,227 3,733 
Year FE  
Yes Yes  Yes Yes  
Yes Yes 
Industry FE  
Yes Yes  Yes Yes  
Yes Yes 
Mean: Countries without 
Treaty  
11.793 11.793  0.562 0.562  
2.868 2.868 
 
Note: Total revenue and the size of employees are estimated in their logarithm form. Tax treaty implies the interaction term 
between dummy for treaty country and a dummy for post treaty ratification. In columns [3] and [4], we drop the direct effect of 
post treaty ratification dummy due to multicollinearity issues. The control variables earlier described in Section 2.2 are only 
included in columns 2, 4 and 6. Standard errors in parentheses are clustered at the country level. Probability values are *p < 
0.1; **p < 0.05; ***p < 0.01. 
 
3.2.2 Correlation between tax treaty components and small business outcomes 
 
Next, we explore the correlation between some of the components of tax treaties and 
small business outcomes in Africa by relying on the repeated cross-section of the World 
Bank enterprise survey for 21 countries with data available across years4. We selectively 
considered the following components as key explanatory variables: (a) a dummy if the treaty 
considers the OECD model in delivering exception to permanent establishments and 0 if UN 
model5; (b) interest in withholding tax rate in % (OECD=10); (c) royalties withholding tax rate 
in % (OECD=0); (d) dummy if the treaty has source capital gains on ‘land rich’ company 
according to OECD and UN model6; (e) dummy if the treaty has source taxation of earnings 
by top-level managerial officials according to UN model and 0 if OECD model7; and (f) 
assistance in tax collection (1 =yes)8. In each regression in Table 3.2.2.1, we control for the 
industry- and year-fixed effects and the standard errors are clustered at the country level. 
  
These components are the ones with the most reportage and variation from the ICTD 
tax treaty dataset. Furthermore, we considered these components of tax treaties, noting that 
they specifically capture the subsidising (or otherwise) effects of tax treaties on the activities 
of multinationals (Davies, Norbäck and Tekin‐Koru 2009; Hearson 2016).  
 
We only discuss the most extensive estimate that controls for the size (asset value) 
and legal status of the sampled enterprises. However, the estimates do not change whether 
these covariates are included (or not) in the model. We find a 29 per cent significant decline 
in employee size with the inclusion of tax treaty components that align with the OECD model 
in delivering exceptions to permanent establishments (see Panel A Column 6). Likewise, the 
results in Column 4 of Panel D suggest that small businesses in tax treaty countries with 
 
4 The sampled countries are Algeria, Republic of Benin, Burundi, Cameroon, Congo Democratic Republic, Ethiopia, Gambia, 
Kenya, Lesotho, Madagascar, Malawi, Mali, Mauritania, Morocco, Mozambique, Namibia, Sierra Leone, South Africa, 
Swaziland, and Uganda. The sample period ranges 2005–2018. 
5 OECD model states that a building site or construction or installation project will constitute a PE, whereas the UN model states 
that a building site, a construction, assembly or installation project or supervisory activities in connection thereof will constitute a 
PE. 
6 See UN model Article 13(4) 
7 See UN model Article 16(2) 
8 See UN model Article 27 
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provisions for source capital gains for ‘land rich’ companies according to OECD and UN 
model see a 15.2 per cent decline in the likelihood of an enterprise introducing a new product 
(i.e. innovation). The adverse effect of these two components of tax treaties suggests that 
exceptions to permanent establishments and provisions for source capital gains could 
subsidise the flow and operations of multinational enterprises and could have a crowding-out 
effect on the activities of small businesses, seen by the decline in the size of employees and 
innovation. 
 
The estimates from Column 2, Panel B, suggest an about 12.9 per cent increase in 
enterprises’ total revenue with an additional increase in the rate for withholding tax charges 
on multinational enterprises. We also show from Column 4, Panel C that an additional 
increase in the interest in withholding tax rate on royalties leads to a 4 per cent increase in 
the likelihood of an enterprise to introduce a new product or be innovative. These effects on 
performance and innovation from an increase in withholding tax rates interest and on 
royalties could be because these provisions increase the cost of foreign-owned rivals’ 
products and intellectual property – and hence competing products by indigenous enterprises 
becomes lower.  
 
The estimates from Panel D (Column 2) show a marginal negative effect on 
enterprises’ total revenue, including source capital gains on ‘land rich’ companies according 
to the OECD and UN model. Overall, we do not find a significant effect for the inclusion of the 
tax treaty component that supports the UN model for source taxation of earnings by top-level 
management officials and assistance in tax collection. 
 





Revenue  Innovation (1 if firm 
introduced new product) 
 Size of employees 
  [1] [2]  [3] [4]  [5] [6] 
          
Panel A          














Control variables  
No Yes  No Yes  No Yes 
Firm observation  
11,032 10,709  7,599 7,290  12,139 
11,769 
Year FE  
Yes Yes  Yes Yes  Yes 
Yes 
Country FE  
Yes Yes  Yes Yes  Yes 
Yes 
          
Panel B          













Control variables  
No Yes  No Yes  No Yes 
Firm observation  
11,032 10,709  7,599 7,290  12,139 
11,769 
Year FE  
Yes Yes  Yes Yes  Yes 
Yes 
Country FE  
Yes Yes  Yes Yes  Yes 
Yes 
          
Panel C          
Withholding tax rate: Royalties WHT in 













Control variables  
No Yes  No Yes  No Yes 
Firm observation  
10,880 10,557  7,527 7,218  11,982 
11,612 
Year FE  
Yes Yes  Yes Yes  Yes 
Yes 
Country FE  




          
Panel D          
Source capital gains on ‘land rich’ 













Control variables  
No Yes  No Yes  No Yes 
Firm observation  
11,032 10,709  7,599 7,290  12,139 
11,769 
Year FE  
Yes Yes  Yes Yes  Yes 
Yes 
Country FE  
Yes Yes  Yes Yes  Yes 
Yes 
          
Panel E  
       
 
Source taxation of earnings by top-level 













Control variables  
No Yes  No Yes  No Yes 
Firm observation  
11,032 10,709  7,599 7,290  12,139 
11,769 
Year FE  
Yes Yes  Yes Yes  Yes 
Yes 
Country FE  
Yes Yes  Yes Yes  Yes 
Yes 
          
Panel F          













Control variables  
No Yes  No Yes  No Yes 
Firm observation  
11,032 10,709  7,599 7,290  12,139 
11,769 
Year FE  
Yes Yes  Yes Yes  Yes 
Yes 
Country FE  
Yes Yes  Yes Yes  Yes 
Yes 
 
Note: Total revenue and the size of employees are estimated in their logarithm form. In columns [1], [3] and [5] are estimates 
without control variables, while columns [2], [4] and [6] include the control variables earlier described in Section 2.2. Standard 
errors in parentheses are clustered at the country-level. Probability values are *p < 0.1; **p < 0.05; ***p < 0.01. 
 
3.3 Additional robustness  
 
We first consider a different clustering level for the robustness check; that is, 
clustering at the industry-country level. This level of clustering is necessitated to check how 
the main result performs when considering a two-level sample aggregation. We find a 
consistent negative effect of a tax treaty on the three outcome variables we have considered. 
 
Table 3.3.1 Impact of a treaty on small business outcomes (considering clustering at 








Revenue  Innovation (1 if firm introduced new 
product) 
 
Size of employees 
  [1] [2]  [3] [4]  [5] [6] 
















Control variables  
No Yes  No Yes  
No Yes 
Country observation  
9 9  9 9  
9 9 
Firm observation  
5,328 3,159  5,000 3,200  
6,227 3,733 
Year FE  
Yes Yes  Yes Yes  
Yes Yes 
Industry FE  
Yes Yes  Yes Yes  
Yes Yes 
Mean: Countries without 
Treaty  
12.178 12.178  0.530 0.530  
3.105 3.105 
 




The second robustness check is the re-estimation of the difference-in-difference 
model without the inclusion of firms from Malawi and Mali. These countries are only classified 
in the treatment group because they have significant economic cooperation with treaty 
countries apart from definite foreign investment flows. Therefore, we exclude them from the 
treatment group to check the consistency of the earlier results. As shown in Table 3.3.2, the 
signs of the estimates do not change and are economically similar to the earlier estimations 
in Table 3.2.2.1. 
 
Table 3.3.2 Impact of a treaty on small business outcomes (excluding firms from 








Revenue  Innovation (1 if firm introduced new 
product) 
 
Size of employees 
  [1] [2]  [3] [4]  [5] [6] 
















Control variables  
No Yes  No Yes  
No Yes 
Country observation  
6 6  6 6  
6 6 
Firm observation  
3,783 2,067  3,888 2,417  
4,403 2,483 
Year FE  
Yes Yes  Yes Yes  
Yes Yes 
Industry FE  
Yes Yes  Yes Yes  
Yes Yes 
Mean: Countries without 
Treaty  
12.178 12.178  0.530 0.530  
3.105 3.105 
 
Note: The data for this analysis excludes firms from Malawi and Mali. Other notes are similar to those in Table 3.2.2.1.  
 
As shown in Table A1.2 in the appendix, there are some significant differences in the 
baseline characteristic of enterprises in countries in the treatment and comparison group. For 
instance, from Table A1.2, we see that there are significant differences between firms in the 
treatment and comparison groups in the legal status (i.e., sole proprietor and limited liability 
company), ownership status, the experience of a top manager, age of enterprise, technology 
utilisation, obstacles from the external environment, access to overdraft and line of credit, the 
indicator of the value of total machinery, and the combined value of land and machinery. As 
a result of these differences in the characteristics of the sampled firms at the baseline, these 
initial conditions could have a separate influence on the subsequent changes in the 
estimated outcome. We apply the propensity score matching with the baseline data to 
address the observable heterogeneity in the initial conditions by ensuring the comparison 
group is similar to the treatment group and then applying the difference-in-difference 
estimation to the matched sample.  
 
The matching that we estimated based on the observable characteristics of the 
enterprises is successful, as shown in Figure 3.3.1. The differences between firms in the 
treatment group and those in the comparison group are eliminated after the matching. The 
results of the difference-in-difference analysis on the matched data are presented in Table 
3.3.3. The results show that the initial negative impact of a tax treaty on the different outcome 
variables (as presented in Panels A-C) is retained despite matching firms in the treatment 













Note: Treatment and Control  imply those countries with tax treaty ratification and those without any form of a tax treaty. 
 








Revenue  Innovation (1 if firm introduced new 
product) 
 
Size of employees 
  [1] [2]  [3] [4]  [5] [6] 
















Control variables  
No Yes  No Yes  
No Yes 
Country observation  
9 9  9 9  
9 9 
Firm observation  
3,158 3,158  3,199 3,199  
3,732 3,732 
Year FE  
Yes Yes  Yes Yes  
Yes Yes 
Industry FE  
Yes Yes  Yes Yes  
Yes Yes 
Mean: Countries without 
Treaty  
11.724 11.724  0.571 0.571  
2.834 2.834 
 
Note: The data for this study are from the matched sample of firms in the treatment and comparison groups, which is 
based on observable characteristics. Other notes are similar to those in Table 3.2.2.1.  
 
3.4 Heterogeneous effects  
 
We examine whether the treatment effects vary by the characteristics of the 
enterprise. Of particular interest is the heterogeneity of effect by the size of the enterprise, 
internationalisation status and whether the enterprise is a subsidiary of a multinational. There 
are some documented observable differences in small business outcomes with foreign 
investment, depending on the size, internationalisation status and subsidiary of a 
multinational (Reyes 2018; Narula and Pineli 2019). One of the reasons it may be important 
to understand how different sizes of small businesses and their international status matter in 
determining the extent of the impact of tax treaties is that policymakers might be interested in 
whether treaties may have a differential impact on enterprises depending on these 
characteristics. 
 
We explore this in Table A1.4, where we estimate separate outcome models for 
enterprises with an employee size greater than ten and less than 50 workers (small 
enterprises), and those with employee size greater than 51 and less than 250 (medium 
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enterprises). We also explore in Table A1.5 a separate model for firms that are not 
internationally exposed and those that are internationally exposed based on having an 
international-quality certification by an internationally-recognised standard organisation. In 
Table A1.6, we test for heterogeneity by the subsidiary status of a multinational, noting a 
well-known difference in the impact of foreign investment presence across the enterprise’s 
subsidiary status. 
 
In the discussion of heterogeneity, we only focus on columns that adjust for the firm- 
and macro-level control variables. We find from Table A1.4 the evidence of heterogeneity 
along with total revenue and the total size of the enterprise (using total employee size) 
dimension of firm’ outcomes. Small enterprises face a more significant negative impact on 
these dimensions of outcomes from tax treaties than medium-sized firms. In terms of 
innovation, we find that medium-sized firms are significantly and negatively affected, unlike 
the coefficients of smaller firms that are negative but not significant. From Table A1.5, we 
also find a significant negative impact of a tax treaty on total revenue and innovation for firms 
with no internationalisation, unlike firms with some level of internationalisation. However, we 
do not find any heterogeneity effect on total employment by whether the firm has an 
international certification or not. Finally, we do not find any evidence of heterogeneity based 





There is a growing literature on tax treaties and their consequences on developing 
countries. Constrained by credible datasets, some of the questions regarding the implications 
of tax treaties between developing countries and other countries – mostly country of origin for 
foreign capital and investment – have remained mostly unanswered. Some of the previous 
studies have provided evidence regarding the effect of treaties and foreign investment, with 
scant evidence regarding its effect on small businesses, which are essential sources of 
technological innovation, job creation and overall industrial growth. Moreover, these small 
businesses are also the most affected by FDI inflow that could arise from tax treaties. 
 
Our main findings present evidence that there are adverse small business outcomes 
(including revenues, innovation and growth) from ratified tax treaties between developing 
African countries and other capital ‘rich’ countries. These negative relationships are seen 
from firm-level data across nine countries in the Sub-Sahara African region. Some 
heterogeneity in effect exists by the size of the enterprises and the extent of their 
internationalisation links.  
 
The likely explanation for the negative effect between tax treaties and small business 
outcomes could be due to intense foreign competition from foreign investment flows induced 
by the treaty ratification or the negative impact of tax treaties on host-country tax revenues 
that subsequently leads to a decline in the provision of public goods required for small 
business growth, among others. It is left for future studies to actually determine the extent to 
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Table A1.1 Sample countries by survey years 
 
 Pre Post 
Treatment   
Mali 2010 2016 
Kenya 2007 2018 
Malawi 2009 2014 
Lesotho 2009 2016 
Comparison 
  
Sierra Leone 2009 2017 
Swaziland 2006 2016 
Uganda 2006 2013 
Mauritania 2006 2014 
Namibia 2006 2014 
 
Note: Survey periods are from World Bank Enterprise Surveys 
 




[Countries without tax treaty) 
 Treatment [Countries 




































































































































Note: We include the disaggregated asset values in the test of a difference since there are no issues of multicollinearity in the 
test of difference, unlike the regression analysis. Probability values are p < 0.1; p < 0.05; p < 0.01. The values that are 
presented are the mean of the variables. 
 
Table A1.3 Fixed effect regression - tax treaty and foreign investment 
 
 Panel A  Panel B  Panel C 
 
Foreign investment to 
GDP 
 Portfolio investment 
 
 Foreign investment to gross fixed 
capital formation 
 [1] [2]  [3] [4]  [5] [6] 













Control variable No Yes 
 
No 
Yes  No 
Yes 
Country observation 9 9 
 
9 
9  9 
9 
Firm observation 6,625 6,625 
 
3,448 
3,448  5,624 
5,624 
FE Yes Yes 
 
Yes 
Yes  Yes 
Yes 
Mean: Sample without treaty 6.580 6.580 
 
17.643 
17.643  15.420 
15.420 
 
Note: These observations were taken for all firms in the sample for nine countries. The dependent variables are the net inflow of 
foreign direct investment as a percentage of GDP, net portfolio investment at current US$ (log) and foreign direct investment as 
a percentage of gross fixed capital formation. Data for the first two indicators of foreign investment are obtained from the World 
Bank World Development Indicators, while data for the third indicator is obtained from the UNCTAD statistics. Columns (2), (4), 
and (6) include the control variables – the logarithm value of gross domestic product per capita and inflation rate. Columns (1), 
(3), and (5) are estimates without including these control variables. Standard errors are in parentheses. The probability values 
are ***p < 0.01 
























































































2,012 1,160 1,904 1,181 2,367 1,389  1,177 627 1,200 669 1,291 703 
Year FE  
Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes  Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Industry 
FE  











0.632 0.632 5.011 5.011 
 
Note: This heterogeneity is only observed for firms with an employee size greater than ten and less than 50, which we call small 
firms, and those with employees greater than 51 and less than 250, which we classify as medium-size firms based on the 
OECD firm classification. The tax treaty implies the interaction term between dummy for treaty country and a dummy for post 
treaty ratification. In columns [3] and [4], and [9] and [10], the direct effect of post treaty ratification dummy is dropped due to 
multicollinearity issues. The control variables are those included in Table 3.2.21. Standard errors in parentheses are clustered at 




Table A1.5 Heterogeneity by internationalisation status of domestic firms 
 
  Panel A: Firms with No Internationalisation  Panel B: Firms with Internationalisation 
 
 


















































































 4,275 2,548 3,947 2,576 4,929 2,992  842 482 790 470 995 571 
Year FE  Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes  Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Industry 
FE 













0.668 0.668 3.976 3.976 
 
Note: This heterogeneity is only observed for firms who report no international standard certification (i.e., not internationalised) 
and those with international certification, which we call internationalised. The tax treaty, as usual, implies the interaction term 
between dummy for treaty country and a dummy for post treaty ratification. In columns [3] and [4], and [9] and [10], the direct 
effect of post treaty ratification dummy is dropped due to multicollinearity issues. The control variables are those included in 





Table A1.6 Heterogeneity by subsidiary status of domestic firms 
 
  Panel A: Non-subsidiary Firms  Panel B: Subsidiary Firms 
 
 





















































































 4,173 2,498 3,849 2,490 4,857 2,949  1,155 661 1,151 710 1,370 784 
Year FE  Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes  Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Industry 
FE 













0.668 0.668 3.976 3.976 
 
Note: We observe the heterogeneity for firms that report their subsidiary status. It includes firms that are subsidiaries or part of 
larger cooperation with headquarters abroad. The tax treaty, again, implies the interaction term between dummy for treaty 
country and a dummy for post treaty ratification. In columns [3] and [4], and [9] and [10], the direct effect of post treaty 
ratification dummy is dropped due to multicollinearity issues. The control variables are those included in Table 3.2.2.1. We 
cluster the standard errors in parentheses at the country level. Probability values are *p < 0.1; **p < 0.05; ***p < 0.01. 
 
Figure A1.1 How treaties affect domestic enterprise 
 
 
 
 
 
 
